After carefully observing the points outlined by @fig and @0xhoratius I’d like to present my own take on the issue of organization delegates and consolidation of power which I believe goes hand in hand with the problem of sybil resistance. But let me state my premises and address a few of the points mentioned above first.
From two very simple premises:
- The ethos of (Hop) DAO is to be as decentralized as possible, hence the D in the name
- Consolidation of executive power reduces the decentralization of a DAO; the more unique entities hold executive power, the more decentralized a DAO is
We can conclude that:
- Sybil attackers compromise the decentralization of a DAO
- Consolidation of executive power within the hands of a few entities could potentially(1) compromise the decentralization of a DAO
(1) depending on the method of consolidation and how such executive power is used
The debate around delegation is a complex issue to discuss so I shall attempt to keep it as simple and short as possible while addressing the point brought up prior, but the challenge here is what constitutes as a unique entity (isn’t that the million dollar question?).
That is precisely the issue here and a major point of contention. It neither a matter of reputation nor competence but identity and how to correspond on-chain credentials (e.g. voting power) to a real person in a decentralized, anonymous and trustless manner which is yet another currently unsolved issue (or at least not fully solved problem). Answer me this please: how would you prove the following two in a TRUSTLESS manner: a) whether you represent n people controlling m on-chain credentials or m on-chain credentials controlled by n people? b) that the delegates align with the delegators
Looking at this from a DAO’s perspective, it is only a question of decentralization; once one entity gains 51% of the executive power, they are free to do as they please and nullify the rest and I am merely pointing out the possibility which is the risk here. “Collectives” are much more likely to seize that 51% than “individuals”, and by delegating to a collective we increase that risk. This is not about the benefits but rather than the (existential) risk this brings to the table. Once again, it boils down to the fundamental question of on-chain identity… What is a collective? What is an individual? And how do we map on-chain credentials to real people in a decentralized, anonymous and trustless manner? That problem should have been solved first before the conception of delegated proof of stake (dpos) and is an inherent existential risk to the entire idea.
It does not matter matter whether it’s an organization with majority delegation or a person, it’s just that we can take an educated guess that it is far more likely for an organization to become such than an individual. Consolidation of executive power poses an existential risk to decentralization of DAOs, and organizations are far more likely to succeed at doing so. We should treat the cause not the symptoms.
I would very much rather have no delegates and very few proposals and votes rather than a handful of delegates ending up with +51% of the executive power and imposing their vision (be it favorable or unfavorable) because that goes against the neutral spirit of decentralization. At this point, a DAO would just become an AO. Driving slowly towards an unknown and distant destination is better than ramming straight into a tree in my humble opinion. We need the issue of on-chain identity solved, and we need it solved swiftly first before we can have any fruitful discussion on DPOS/delegation.
As for me personally, I would neither delegate to any entity that publicly presents itself as an organization nor a person which owns a disproportionate amount of executive power already for the reasons I’ve explained above.
Best regards,