I have voted āNo Changeā on this temperature check. I am mostly in alignment with others that this proposal needs more time for discussion, with a focus on a solution that can not only help short term but long term as well.
As for the liquidity incentive topic itself, I do believe there is a discussion there that is worth having. Iām not sure it is necessarily a super important issue, but I do think there are possible governance-specific issues that may be overlooked from the above discussion. Liquidity does not always have to be a trader specific issue, and I donāt think itās something that can be completely ignored or viewed as a non-issue.
For example, I checked the slippage of buying 90,000 HOP on Uniswap about a few hours ago and again right now. Slippage was 7.42% and now 8.39%, with about a $.017 difference between the effective Uniswap price and what is listed on Coingecko. While I am aware that isnāt exactly a small purchase, that is the amount to meet the Delegate Compensation threshold, so I felt it was a relevant example. For perspective, $1000 is about 1% slippage right now, $5000 is about 3.75%.
As a newer delegate, I felt that was something worth mentioning as I had a similar experience when I was purchasing my HOP (off the top of my head, I had a similar slippage amountā¦ I think I lost about $.01 or so with each purchase in totality). While it did not deter me from joining, the lack of liquidity has the effect of reducing the amount of voting power a newer members of the DAO would have otherwise (or a newer investor who delegates to a DAO delegator). While relatively small, this is a technical barrier to entry and a centralization issue. In a case like this, someone who wanted to buy 90,000 HOP would need to spend $16,200 with slippage, but without slippage could afford about 100,000 HOP with that same dollar amount. That 10,000 HOP difference is basically the entire 6 month incentivization trial worth of HOP.
Iād also add, the slippage from lack of liquidity is effectively a reduction in earnings from LP side. If those who are receiving HOP for LP services are losing a certain % of their earnings to slippage, they may seek to provide liquidity to other pairs due to it no longer being as profitable. This may cause a circular issue where LPs start to leave due to the reduction in profit, which then turns into even less liquidity. Of course, this effective cut in rewards would also apply to anyone receiving HOP as compensation for a service.